Justice Tremblay-Lamer of the Federal Court has quashed the controversial case against Adil Charkaoui, the alleged terrorist detained on a security certificate.
In his 2004 case before the Federal Court, the government made submissions that his interest in karate could infer his involvement in terrorism,
[50]To add to the demonstration of danger to national security and to any person, the Ministers link the respondent with violence and explain that he is a karate and martial arts enthusiast, and add that (see page 5, exhibit R-3):
[translation] In the past, it has been observed that some individuals involved with Al-Qaeda are devoted to the practice of karate and/or the martial arts. In particular Ziard Jarrah, who was part of the group that hijacked American Airlines Flight 93, (sic) had trained in the martial arts in preparation for the September 11, 2001 operation.
[51]The Ministers expressly and unequivocally associate the respondent with a sleeper agent in the bin Laden network and use Ressam's story as a typical example.
[emphasis added]
All those with even a peripheral interest in martial arts should take notice, especially since no such flight on 9/11 even existed.
The Charkaoui case has been yet another one pointed to by critics of the shoddy research and baseless allegations used against vulnerable populations, who repeatedly are determined innocent by the courts.
The 2007 SCC decision struck down the security certificate legislation, ss. 33, 77 -85 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) as a violation of ss. 7, 9-10 of the Charter.
But the major issue with his case is that the supposed evidence held against him had been destroyed by CSIS, and was likely unreliable in the first place, gained in part at least through coercive measures.
Charkaoui had his own concerns about torture, but based on Suresh, security certificate detainees were not held to have the same protections against deportations.
The Federal Court decision released this week (in French only) said that the government's assumption that national security interests would be compromised by individual rights was erroneous. After reviewing all of the evidence, she found that most of it could be disclosed. What's also interesting is that she ruled out any possibility of appeal,
[105] Ayant consacré beaucoup de temps et d’efforts à ce dossier, la Cour comprend et partage la frustration de ceux qui auraient préféré qu’il se termine par un jugement au mérite basé sur une évaluation de l’ensemble de la preuve à l’appui du certificat. Cependant, la LIPR confère aux ministres la faculté de retirer cette preuve, et la Cour, tout comme les ministres, l’intéressé et le public, doit vivre avec les conséquences de l’usage que les ministres font de cette faculté.
[106] La Cour est également consciente, comme la Cour suprême l’était déjà dans Kourtessis, supra,
que l’on s’attend généralement à ce qu’il existe un moyen quelconque d’en appeler de la décision d’un tribunal de première instance,"
et que cette attente est encore plus forte lorsque la décision qu’on cherche à porter en appel est importante aux yeux du public.
[107] Il n’est reste pas moins que le devoir de la Cour est d’appliquer les lois adoptées par le
Parlement. Le Parlement a adopté, dans la LIPR [IRPA], des limites précises et restrictives sur le droit
d’appel…[108] La Cour convient que si elle s’était livrée à un exercice de pondération judiciaire où l’équité
procédurale aurait primé sur la sécurité nationale, la question de savoir si elle était en droit de le
faire serait une question de droit qui aurait franchi le seuil requis pour la certification d’une question
de portée générale.
A video from the press conference on Weds. is available here.
