Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII

Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this last week:

  1. Exposoft Solutions Inc. (Re) 2013 ONSC 5798

    [1] This was a motion which should never have been. It also involved the smallest amount of money I have encountered to date in a Commercial List matter – less than $5,000. But, being a motion brought in the Toronto Region, about two inches of materials were served and filed, and four cases handed up during the course of the argument, capped off with a request for full indemnity costs of $28,136.23. Just another day in the wonderful world of litigation, Toronto-style.

  2. Bank of Montreal v. Faibish 2013 ONSC 5848

    [6] In these times of very constrained judicial resources, I am loath to schedule refusals motions, in large part because experience shows that in most cases they have little tangible impact on the evidence adduced at trial. Dare I say that frequently refusals are no more than tactical posturing by a party, and when the party is faced with the issue of what a trial judge likely will want to hear by way of material evidence, advisements or refusals often crumble in the weeks just before trial

  3. Levinsky v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank 2013 ONSC 5657

    [1] For 11 years Blair Levinsky, the plaintiff, worked for the Toronto-Dominion Bank in its Investment Banking Group at TD Securities Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Bank. In January, 2010, Levinsky resigned from the Bank to start his own hedge fund. Since 2002, when he had been promoted to Vice-President, Levinsky had participated in the Bank’s Long Term Compensation Plan. Under that Plan, each year Levinsky was granted a certain number of Restricted Share Units, or RSUs, which matured and became payable in cash three years after their grant.

The most-consulted French-language decision was R. c. Beaudry 2007 CSC 5

L’accusé, un agent de police, a été inculpé d’entrave à la justice en vertu du par. 139(2) du Code criminel pour avoir omis délibérément de recueillir les éléments de preuve nécessaires au dépôt éventuel d’accusations criminelles contre P, un autre policier, dont il avait des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’il avait conduit un véhicule à moteur en état d’ébriété. Au procès, l’accusé a prétendu que sa décision constituait un exercice légitime de la discrétion policière alors que le ministère public a soutenu que la décision était fondée sur un traitement de faveur. Le juge du procès a conclu que l’accusé n’avait pas exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire lorsqu’il a délibérément omis de recueillir des échantillons d’haleine, et qu’il avait plutôt accordé un traitement de faveur à P. Le juge l’a donc condamné. La Cour d’appel, à la majorité, a confirmé la déclaration de culpabilité. Le présent pourvoi en est un de plein droit et la question en litige est de savoir si le verdict est déraisonnable au sens du sous-al. 686(1)a)(i) du Code criminel.

Comments are closed.