On the heels of the European Court of Justice’s decision, discussed on Slaw here and here, to require Google to suppress links to particular web sites that had ‘irrelevant and outdated’ personal information about a complainant, and US courts’ refusal to do the same, the British Columbia Supreme Court has now gone a step further: it has ordered Google to ensure that searches for particular topics or a particular company do not find the company defendant in the action before it.
The principals of the defendant company were accused of stealing trade secrets of the plaintiff and of using them to do business. The individual defendants were hard to find in person and had apparently made some efforts not to be found – but their business could be found online for those who searched for it.
For this reason the court required Google to stop people from finding the company.
The order applies to Google worldwide, not just to google.ca. Since the company was doing business into the US, one understands the attraction of the broader order.
Nevertheless, is this a justifiable result, either for an order against google.ca or for the broader one against google.com? How could the court have given an effective remedy against the defendants without such an order? An order restricted to google.ca (which Google may have been prepared to go along with) would have had little impact, according to the plaintiff.
Is this a free speech case, or ‘just’ an intellectual property case? If such an order can be made in an IP case, what prevents it from being made in a free speech case, and by a court in a place whose notions of free speech may be more restrictive than ours?