Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII

Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed* on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this last week:

1. Governing Council of the University of Toronto v CUPE Local 3902, Unit 1, 2015 CanLII 38167 (ON LA)

The parties agreed upon two new and important provisions that would provide tuition and bursary funding. There provisions were part of a Memorandum that was rejected in February. Data was then exchanged, modifications ensued and the University accepted the union’s counteroffer leading to the March 18 Memorandum. From the point of view of Mr Culpepper and a bare majority of the union’s membership, these changes were insufficient. But from the point of view of the majority of the union’s experienced bargaining team, having regard to everything that had occurred to that point, including almost a month out on strike, these changes represented a reasonable outcome, all things considered. The bargaining committee compromised (as did the University) and did so on the basis where the union now freely and candidly acknowledges that the data indicates that there will be sufficient monies in the capped funds available to achieve the stated objectives.
(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2015 FCA 17

[52] In this case, it is true that Parliament has vested jurisdiction in adjudicators under the Code to decide questions of statutory interpretation, such as the question before us. However, on the statutory interpretation issue before us, the current state of adjudicators’ jurisprudence is one of persistent discord. Adjudicators on one side do not consider themselves bound by the holdings on the other side. As a result, for some time now, the answer to the question whether the Code permits dismissals on a without cause basis has depended on the identity of the adjudicator. Draw one adjudicator and one interpretation will be applied; draw another and the opposite interpretation will be applied. Under the rule of law, the meaning of a law should not differ according to the identity of the decision-maker: Taub v. Investment Dealers Association of Canada, 2009 ONCA 628 (CanLII), 98 O.R. (3d) 169 at paragraph 67.
(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. City of Toronto v Uber Canada Inc. et al., 2015 ONSC 3572

[1] This evening, a tourist from London visiting Toronto will take out her smartphone and press a button to activate an “app” that she downloaded months or even years ago. Her smartphone will display a map showing her location and a number of tiny black cars moving on the map near her. Each “car” on her map represents the location of a driver who is willing to carry her to her destination for hire. When she presses a button on screen, her phone will send a digital request to a server in Northern California and software on that server will automatically transfer the request to the smartphone of the driver of the car nearest her that she saw on the map. If the driver presses “accept” on his own smartphone, his phone will then send his own data through the same server back to her and they will meet and he will drive her to her destination. Other than the tourist and the driver, no human will participate in making that connection. Software on her phone, on the driver’s phone, at the server in Northern California and throughout the Internet will receive and pass along the data packets sent by each.
(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

The most-consulted French-language decision was SNC-Lavalin inc. c. Société québécoise des infrastructures (Société immobilière du Québec), 2015 QCCA 1153

[33] Les principes applicables en matière d’obligation de motiver sont bien connus et SNC a raison de rappeler qu’il s’agit là d’une obligation fondamentale. Essentiellement, les motifs doivent être suffisants pour comprendre le fondement de la décision et permettre sa révision en appel[7]. Partant, l’intervention de la Cour sera justifiée uniquement lorsque les motifs seront à ce point laconiques qu’ils feront obstacle à un exercice de révision valable[8]. Pour déterminer s’ils sont suffisants, les motifs doivent être examinés dans leur ensemble tout en tenant compte du contexte. Par ailleurs, l’obligation de motiver comporte ses propres limites[9]. Ainsi, un jugement peut être concis et rendre parfaitement justice aux parties sans que le juge ait à rendre compte de chaque témoignage et répondre à chaque prétention[10].
(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of January 2014 we measure the total amount of time spent on the pages rather than simply the number of hits; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

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