In Denis v. Cote, the Supreme Court considered Canada’s new journalist shield law, the Journalist Sources Protection Act (JSPA).[1] The JSPA, which amends both the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code, altered the common law on protections afforded to the confidential sources and notes of journalists.[2]

The common law regime balances two competing public interests in deciding whether names or notes must be disclosed to police or civil plaintiffs. In the criminal context, there is the public interest in the detection and prosecution of crimes (law enforcement), to which journalist notes and sources are . . . [more]

I am currently conducting research to determine whether coercive control can be considered psychological harm for the purpose of the future harm exception to confidentiality and solicitor-client privilege.[1] My research is supported by the OBA Fellowship in Legal Ethics and Professionalism Studies. In that research I’m determining whether a lawyer can disclose, but doing that research has provoked me to wonder whether a lawyer should disclose.

In December 2017, Andrew Berry murdered his children, six-year-old Chloe and four-year-old Aubrey. Berry was convicted of second degree murder. Sarah Cotton, the girls’ mother, feared Berry, claiming that he had made threats . . . [more]

On October 25 & 26, Windsor Law proudly hosted the 2019 conference of the Canadian Association for Legal Ethics. The presentations touched on many of the most important issues confronting the legal profession today. Check out the brief summaries below to stay up to date.

Thematic Index

• Access to justice (see presentations #3 and #11 below)
• Zealous advocacy and its limits (see presentations #1 and #2 below)
• Harassment and discrimination within the profession (presentations #16, 17, 18)
• Teaching ethics in law school (presentations #6, 7, 8, 9)
• The Regulation of Judges (presentations #12, #15)
• The limits of “business-like” lawyer

For years, Slaw commentators (including myself) have called for Canadian law societies to adopt a duty of technological competence for lawyers. On October 19, 2019, a major development occurred, which has largely gone unnoticed. The Federation of Law Societies of Canada amended its Model Code of Professional Conduct to add the following commentary to the competence rule (r. 3.1-2):

[4A] To maintain the required level of competence, a lawyer should develop an understanding of, and ability to use, technology relevant to the nature and area of the lawyer’s practice and responsibilities. A lawyer should understand the benefits and risks associated . . . [more]

It is no secret that that self-regulation can be compromised by the tension between the public interest and the interest of the regulated profession[i]. This tension leads some to say that self-regulation is inherently flawed and should come to an end.

In this column, I suggest that:

• it may be useful to recognize that conflicting professional interests are more in tension in some areas than in others and accordingly to look for ways to mitigate that tension where it is potentially problematic
• there may be limited measures that can be used to mitigate such tension without having to

What privacy issues arise when legal apps are used by the public? What are current best practices for safeguarding privacy interests when developing legal apps? What do developers think? What challenges arise in developing privacy best practices for legal apps?

Along with my colleagues Suzanne Bouclin, Jena McGill and Teresa Scassa, I recently completed a project that tried to answer these questions. A pre-print version of the peer-reviewed article that discusses this project at length can be found here. This column will provide highlights of the discussion contained in that article.

Background

We were inspired to develop privacy best . . . [more]

Should a lawyer decide how much his client should pay him, and then write himself a cheque for that amount, without the client’s agreement? Is a discretionary judicial decision about the value of a legal service an adequate substitute for an agreement between lawyer and client? In Newell v. Sax, the Ontario Court of Appeal effectively answered “yes” to both of these questions. In my view, arbitrary fees invented by lawyers, or judges, are a grave and unnecessary threat to legal ethics. The law should insist on upfront disclosure and clear contractual agreements about legal fees, absent very exceptional . . . [more]

By all accounts, last week’s Ethics Commissioner Report on the SNC-Lavalin controversy was a bombshell, condemning as it did Mr. Trudeau’s improper attempts to infringe the prosecutorial independence of the Attorney-General’s office.

But other than revealing the extraordinary access of SNC-Lavalin to the highest ranks of government and the magnitude of the combined efforts to obtain a deferred prosecution agreement that would dismiss foreign corruption charges against the company, we learned very little we did not know before.

Indeed, the most striking part of Mr. Dion’s report is that he was denied access to important information that would bring all . . . [more]

Like many other teachers of legal ethics, I have started to incorporate more discussions about “lawyer wellness” into my classes in recent years. Issues such as lawyers’ mental health and dealing with stress haven’t traditionally been part of the legal ethics curriculum. It is obvious, however, that they now must. We have undeniable evidence that members of the legal profession disproportionately experience mental health challenges. Given this reality, it’s essential that we acknowledge the importance of lawyer health and happiness in law school and strive to foster a community that works to improve outcomes. Studying this topic in a legal . . . [more]

A lawyer should be a loyal ally for a person with a legal need. This loyalty is at the core of our profession’s value proposition to society. Thus, legal ethics strives to guarantee devoted service to clients. Conflict of interest rules prohibit all situations creating “substantial risk” that the lawyer’s loyalty to a client “would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interest.” Lawyers, as fiduciaries, must be “concerned solely for the beneficiary [client]’s interests, never the fiduciary [lawyer]’s own.”

There is, however, a glaring exception to the duty of selfless loyalty to clients. Lawyers are allowed . . . [more]

The Law Society of Ontario bencher election finished at the end of April. The cost of regulation and the finances of the Law Society were the focus of some of the campaigns by bencher candidates. Perhaps not surprisingly in a campaign context, some of the comments were hyperbolic and some were rather imprecise.

This column seeks to address what lawyers in Ontario are required to pay in order to be able to practice law. The point of this review is to help better understand where the money goes to better inform discussions. I will look at this issue from the . . . [more]

Alberta political Insiders could not have been surprised by Ethics Commissioner Trussler’s decision last Friday finding Jason Kenney’s use of the “Premier” prefix for UCP fundraising correspondence not to be a conflict of interest. That’s because Trussler previously determined in similar cases involving previous Premiers that the use of public office for partisan purposes is beyond the scope of her legislated mandate.

Conflict of interest allegations were levelled by opposition parties against Premier Prentice in 2014, for staging political announcements in ridings with upcoming by-elections, and again in 2015 when Premier Notley attended a political fundraising dinner in Toronto. In . . . [more]