Archive for ‘Substantive Law: Judicial Decisions’
Sex Workers Improve Our Access to Justice
Congratulations to Sheri Kiselbach, members of Sex Workers United Against Violence (SWUAV), and our friends at Pivot Legal Society for your recent Supreme Court Victory!
The SCC was unanimous in ruling that Ms. Keselbach, a former sex worker, and SWUAV, a sex worker-led organization, have public interest standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions related to sex work.
The access to justice issue was before the Supremes after the BC Court of Appeal rejected with the Federal Government’s argument that the parties lacked standing. The standing debate stems from the fact that neither Ms. Kiselbach, as a . . . [more]
B.C. Sex Worker Challenge Will Now Proceed
When Sheryl Kiselbach and the Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society decided to challenge the Criminal Code provisions around prostitution, the chambers judge denied their application for public or private interest standing.
The B.C. Court of Appeal reversed that decision, granting them public interest standing, and this position was upheld this week at the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society.
The appellant’s factum is available here, and the respondent’s factum available here. The factum of some of the interveners are also available online, such . . . [more]
K-K-K-K-K Katmandu
But for the moment we’ll stick to k-k-k-k-k-causation and contribution.
Does Clements-Resurfice material contribution apply between tortfeasors claiming contribution?
Is there any reason in principle not to allow contribution between tortfeasors where their liability to the plaintiff is based on material contribution?
I can’t see one.
(Other than that if we take Clements at face value its ratio deals only with causation of injury in claims for damages in claims based on negligence.)
In principle, there is nothing about the material contribution doctrine to risk doctrine that necessarily limits it to being a basis for causation of plaintiff’s claims for . . . [more]
Whither Stanley?
As I write this the NHL is roughly 12 hours away from locking out the players for the third time in a row; right about now you are thinking that this is going to be a post about labour law (note labour spelled the proper way-with a “u”); but that is not the case. This post is going to trend closer to property law. You may recall that during the last NHL lockout a question arose as to the ownership and awarding of the Stanley Cup which arose in part from Lord Stanley’s words in 1892 when he wrote:
. . . [more]I
Working the System and Contempt of Court
“This is not a case where a contemnor was deprived of the opportunity to purge his contempt . . .”
“Contemnor” — Now there’s a word your don’t run across every day. Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (American) tells us that because the correlative “contemnee” is “exceedingly rare”, the spelling “contemner” is generally preferred. But whether -or or -er, it’s someone guilty of contempt, typically contempt of court, of course. And if you’re curious about what such a person might do to earn this label, you need look no further than the very recent Ontario Court of Appeal case of . . . [more]
The Zen of Petard Hoisting and Maintenance
Hot-shot appellate counsel will tell you to lead with your best argument.
Appellate judges will tell you to get to the point immediately.
Assume, for arguments’ sake – the assumption is easier because you’re assuming that the law is what the law is – that the principles for causation are the same for omissions as they are for commissions: for negligence which is a failure to act as well as negligence which is an action.
Let’s do a small thought experiment. You won’t need a pen or paper, or any electronic equivalent. . . . [more]
Who’s the Boss?
A very witty Master of the Alberta Supreme Court once wrote:
. . . [more][51] Any legal system which has a judicial appeals process inherently creates a pecking order for the judiciary regarding where judicial decisions stand on the legal ladder.
[52] I am bound by decisions of Queen’s Bench judges, by decisions of the Alberta Court of Appeal and by decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Very simply, Masters in Chambers of a superior trial court occupy the bottom rung of the superior courts judicial ladder.
[53] I do not overrule decisions of a judge of this court. The judicial pecking
Four Christians Arguing for Their Right to Religious Freedom at Work Before the European Court of Human Rights
Mandatory Retirement of Partners in Law Firms
One of the interesting developments during the summer slowdown we failed to note here on Slaw was the BC Court of Appeal decision in John McCormick’s case against Fasken Martineau. McCormick is an equity partner in Fasken’s Vancouver office who resisted the mandatory retirement at age 65 required by the partnership agreement, arguing that it contravened the BC Human Rights Code’s prohibition on age discrimination with respect to employees. The critical hinge to his action is whether an equity partner in a law firm should be regarded as an “employee” for the purposes of the Code, thus giving the Human . . . [more]