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Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII

Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed* on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this last week:

  1. Reference re Senate Reform 2014 SCC 32

    [1] The Senate is one of Canada’s foundational political institutions. It lies at the heart of the agreements that gave birth to the Canadian federation. Yet from its first sittings, voices have called for reform of the Senate and even, on occasion, for its outright abolition.

    [2] The Government of Canada now asks this Court, under s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, to answer essentially four questions: (1) Can Parliament unilaterally implement a framework for consultative elections for appointments to the Senate? (2) Can Parliament unilaterally set fixed terms for Senators? (3) Can Parliament unilaterally remove from the Constitution Act, 1867 the requirement that Senators must own land worth $4,000 in the province for which they are appointed and have a net worth of at least $4,000? and (4) What degree of provincial consent is required to abolish the Senate?

    [3] We conclude that Parliament cannot unilaterally achieve most of the proposed changes to the Senate, which require the consent of at least seven provinces representing, in the aggregate, at least half of the population of all the provinces. We further conclude that abolition of the Senate requires the consent of all of the provinces. Abolition of the Senate would fundamentally change Canada’s constitutional structure, including its procedures for amending the Constitution, and can only be done with unanimous federal-provincial consensus.

    [4] This said, our conclusions are tied to the specific questions that were put before the Court. Our role is not to speculate on the full range of possible changes to the Senate. Rather, the proper role of this Court in the ongoing debate regarding the future of the Senate is to determine the legal framework for implementing the specific changes contemplated in the questions put to us. The desirability of these changes is not a question for the Court; it is an issue for Canadians and their legislatures.

  2. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9,

    [1] This appeal calls on the Court to consider, once again, the troubling question of the approach to be taken in judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals. The recent history of judicial review in Canada has been marked by ebbs and flows of deference, confounding tests and new words for old problems, but no solutions that provide real guidance for litigants, counsel, administrative decision makers or judicial review judges. The time has arrived for a reassessment of the question.

  3. West Vancouver School District No. 45 v. Callow 2014 ONSC 2547

    1] Roger Callow is a litigant possessed of seemingly inexhaustible stamina. His behaviour suggests that he views the Canadian court system as something akin to a perpetual, all-day, all you can eat buffet. Having been rebuked by the courts and tribunals of British Columbia, the Federal Court of Canada and the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Callow has now taken aim at Ontario. Ontario lacks the jurisdiction to deal with his case. As a result, Mr. Callow’s litigation must be stopped. Now.

The most-consulted French-language decision was Renvoi relatif à la réforme du Sénat 2014 CSC 32

[1] Le Sénat est une des institutions politiques fondamentales du Canada. Il se situe au cœur des ententes ayant donné naissance à la fédération canadienne. Pourtant, depuis ses premières séances, des voix se sont élevées pour réclamer sa réforme, et même, parfois, son abolition.

[2] Le gouvernement du Canada pose maintenant essentiellement quatre questions à la Cour, en vertu de l’art. 53 de la Loi sur la Cour suprême, L.R.C. 1985, ch. S 26 : (1) Le Parlement peut il unilatéralement instaurer un régime d’élections consultatives en vue de nommer les sénateurs? (2) Le Parlement peut il unilatéralement prévoir des mandats d’une durée fixe pour les sénateurs? (3) Le Parlement peut il retrancher unilatéralement de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 l’exigence selon laquelle les sénateurs doivent posséder des terres d’une valeur de 4 000 $ dans la province pour laquelle ils sont nommés ainsi qu’un avoir net d’au moins 4 000 $? (4) Quel est le degré de consentement provincial nécessaire pour abolir le Sénat?

[3] Nous concluons que le Parlement ne peut unilatéralement apporter au Sénat la plupart des changements proposés, qui exigent le consentement d’au moins sept provinces dont la population confondue représente au moins la moitié de la population de toutes les provinces. Nous concluons en outre que l’abolition du Sénat exige le consentement de l’ensemble des provinces. En effet, l’abolition de cette institution modifierait de façon fondamentale la structure constitutionnelle canadienne, y compris les procédures de modification de la Constitution. Un tel changement exigerait un consensus fédéral provincial unanime.

[4] Cela dit, nos conclusions se limitent aux questions précises qui ont été posées à la Cour à qui il n’appartient pas de spéculer sur l’éventail complet des changements susceptibles de toucher le Sénat. Dans le débat actuel sur l’avenir de cette institution, le rôle de la Cour consiste plutôt à énoncer le cadre légal applicable pour la mise en œuvre des changements précis envisagés par les questions dont elle est saisie. Il ne nous revient pas de juger de l’opportunité de ces changements; il appartient plutôt aux Canadiens et à leurs institutions législatives d’en décider.

* As of January 2014 we measure the total amount of time spent on the pages rather than simply the number of hits; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.

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