Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII

Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed* on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this last week:

1. R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34

[160] In view of our application of the three Grant lines of inquiry to the facts of this appeal, and with great respect to the courts below, we do not find this to be a close call. The police crossed a bright line when, without permission or reasonable grounds, they entered into a private backyard whose occupants were “just talking” and “doing nothing wrong”. The police requested identification, told one of the occupants to keep his hands visible and asked pointed questions about who they were, where they lived, and what they were doing in the backyard. This is precisely the sort of police conduct that the Charter was intended to abolish. Admission of the fruits of that conduct would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This Court has long recognized that, as a general principle, the end does not justify the means (R. v. Mack, 1988 CanLII 24 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, at p. 961). The evidence must be excluded.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. R v Reilly, 2019 ABCA 212

[49] The Crown’s central point was that the level of Crown misconduct evidenced by the shortcomings of the new bail system during the transitional phase did not disclose a level of Crown misconduct justifying a stay. The 24 hour violations were unacceptable, but during the transitional period the level of Crown misconduct did not require a stay to “dissociate the justice system from the impugned state conduct going forward”: Babos at para. 39. It is true that at the time of the respondent’s detention the new system had only been in operation in Edmonton for about five months, and that is a relevant consideration in this appeal. It would not be correct to say, however, that changes within the criminal justice system automatically justify breaches of Charter rights during the transitional period. While the government searches for long-term systemic solutions, it has an obligation to identify short-term transitional solutions that will minimize Charter breaches.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Ashraf v Zinner, 2019 ABQB 389

[123] When Mr. Zinner became aware of SNC’s application to strike the 1201 application in September of 2012, the standard of care Mr. Zinner owed Mr. Ashraf included the duty to advise Mr. Ashraf of his options for dealing with the legal issues, and Mr. Zinner should have advised Mr. Ashraf of the strengths and weaknesses of those options. Although Mr. Zinner sought time to research the jurisdiction of the worker’s compensation legislation to the injuries suffered by Mr. Ashraf as addressed in the 1201 action, no time should have been needed to advise Mr. Ashraf of his ability to amend the Statement of Claim as of right to allege constructive dismissal by SNC. A lawyer has an obligation to identify problems and bring them to the attention of his client: Central Trust Co v Rafuse, 1986 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 147 at para 59. This should have happened at the earliest possible opportunity.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

The most-consulted French-language decision was Dupont-Rachiele c. Société de transport de Montréal, 2019 QCCS 1941

[1] La demanderesse, Madame Corinne Dupont-Rachiele, souhaite entreprendre une action collective contre les défenderesses, lesquelles exigent des frais de 6 $ pour remplacer la carte OPUS une fois que celle-ci est périmée[1].

[2] Elle allègue que la carte OPUS est une carte prépayée au sens de la Loi sur la protection du consommateur[2] (« LPC ») et que les défenderesses violent l’article 187.3 LPC, lequel prévoit que les cartes prépayées ne peuvent avoir de date de péremption.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of January 2014 we measure the total amount of time spent on the pages rather than simply the number of hits; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.