US Supreme Court Patent Case on Laws of Nature

One of the satisfying moments that recurred regularly in Star Trek, the Next Generation, was Captain Jean-Luc Picard’s simple executive gesture and the words, “Make it so.” A lot of magic thinking was bound up with that. The United States Supreme Court, however, has recently told attorneys that no such wishful assertion can be as effective, at least in the universe where human laws intersect with the laws of nature.

Two days ago the court released the decision in Mayo Collaborative Services et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. No. 10–1150. The following is from the headnote:

Although “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable subject matter under §101 of the Patent Act, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185, “an application of a law of nature . . . to a known structure or process may [deserve] patent protection,” id., at 187. But to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, a patent must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words “apply it.” See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 71–72. It must limit its reach to a particular, inventive application of the law.

In essence, Prometheus had described a process whereby a drug dosage was to be determined upon the levels of “certain metabolites” in a patient’s blood, and, of course, these levels are a function of the “laws of nature.” The process following the determination of these levels as described by Prometheus was simply a well-known routine for physicians to follow and an insufficiently “inventive concept” to transmute a law of nature into a patentable process.

As Justice Breyer, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:

If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself. A patent, for example, could not simply recite a law of nature and then add the instruction “apply the law.” Einstein, we assume, could not have patented his famous law by claiming a process consisting of simply telling linear accelerator operators to refer to the law to determine how much energy an amount of mass has produced (or vice versa). Nor could Archime­des have secured a patent for his famous principle of flotation by claiming a process consisting of simply telling boat builders to refer to that principle in order to deter­mine whether an object will float.