Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII
Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed* on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.
For this last week:
- Hryniak v. Mauldin 2014 SCC 7
[1] Ensuring access to justice is the greatest challenge to the rule of law in Canada today. Trials have become increasingly expensive and protracted. Most Canadians cannot afford to sue when they are wronged or defend themselves when they are sued, and cannot afford to go to trial. Without an effective and accessible means of enforcing rights, the rule of law is threatened. Without public adjudication of civil cases, the development of the common law is stunted.
[2] Increasingly, there is recognition that a culture shift is required in order to create an environment promoting timely and affordable access to the civil justice system. This shift entails simplifying pre-trial procedures and moving the emphasis away from the conventional trial in favour of proportional procedures tailored to the needs of the particular case. The balance between procedure and access struck by our justice system must come to reflect modern reality and recognize that new models of adjudication can be fair and just.
- R. v. Koczab (A.) 2013 MBCA 43
1 The Crown appeals the accused’s acquittals on one count of trafficking and on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking relating to 17 one-kilogram bricks of cocaine found in a hidden compartment following a traffic stop. While the trial judge held that the detention was not arbitrary within the meaning of s. 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), he excluded this evidence after finding that the accused had been sufficiently detained to trigger his rights under s. 10 of the Charter.
2 The Crown raises two issues. The first issue is whether the trial judge erred in finding that the accused had been psychologically detained by the police officer, thereby breaching his s. 10 Charter rights. The second issue raised is whether the trial judge erred by excluding the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.
- Marvco Colour Research Ltd. v. Harris [1982] 2 SCR 774
The defence of non est factum was not available to respondents. Any person who fails to exercise reasonable care in signing a document is precluded from relying on non est factum as against a person who relies upon that document in good faith and for value. The application of the principle, which is based in part on the need for commercial certainty and security, depends on the circumstances of each case. Here, while both appellant and respondents are innoncent of any wrongdoing as against any persons, it was the carelessness of the respondents which resulted in the wrongdoing being able to inflict the loss. Simple justice demanded that the party able to prevent the loss through the exercise of reasonable care
The most-consulted French-language decision was R. c. Auclair, 2013 QCCA 671
[8] Le juge de première instance a été désigné pour gérer ce dossier. Il a constaté l’existence d’embûches hors du commun et de nombreuses lacunes, notamment dans la divulgation de la preuve et son accès. Devant l’amoncellement de difficultés, il a pris les choses en main, comme c’est son devoir. Comme le souligne le juge Casey Hill[6] :
Originally cast in terms of inherent authority to control the processes of the court and prevention of abuse of the process, it is today recognized that a trial judge has a duty to manage the trial process balancing fairness to the parties as well as efficient and orderly discharge of court process. Judicial management of litigation recognizes that “there is more at stake than just the interests of the accused”. Management involves control, direction and administration in the conduct of a trial. This power, settled within a broad discretion, relates to the entirety of the trial proceeding extending beyond the scope of pre-trial case management rules designed for “effective and efficient case management”.
[9] C’est dans ce contexte que le juge de première instance a prononcé plusieurs ordonnances, dont celle de diviser les chefs d’accusation et les accusés, d’ordonner une divulgation de la preuve plus complète et surtout, d’arrêter les procédures à l’égard des chefs autres que complot de meurtre et meurtre en raison de délais à venir qui lui paraissaient déraisonnables. C’est cette dernière décision, prononcée le 31 mai 2011, qui est l’objet de l’appel.
[10] La question est donc : l’appelante démontre-t-elle que le juge de première instance a erré en ordonnant l’arrêt des procédures relatives aux chefs autres que complot de meurtre et meurtre, au motif que les délais, auxquels s’ajoutaient des délais anticipés, étaient déraisonnables? J’estime que la réponse est non. À cet égard, il faut rappeler que le juge était à même d’évaluer toute la situation et sa connaissance fine du dossier mérite une grande déférence.
* As of January 2014 we measure the total amount of time spent on the pages rather than simply the number of hits; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.
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