Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII

Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed* on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this last week:

1. Cruz v. McPherson, 2014 ONSC 4841

[30] Based on the information contained in the marketing brochure, the Cruzs’ Statement of Claim alleges that there is a partnership between Summit Legal (a corporation) and Fireman Wolfe LLP. The Statement of Claim, however, does not allege – nor could it allege – that there is a partnership comprised of a corporation (Summit Legal), a limited partnership (Fireman Wolfe, LLP), and two lawyers (Mr. Fireman and Mr. Wolfe).

[31] In other words, Mr. Fireman and Mr. Wolfe are not alleged to be partners of the pertinent partnership comprised of Summit Legal and Fireman Wolfe LLP nor could that be alleged, because the brochure discloses a connection only between Summit Legal and Fireman Wolfe LLP. Mr. Fireman and Mr. Wolfe’s position is akin to that of Ms. Popova, who is the principal of Summit Legal, but not a partner of the requisite partnership.

2. Roynat Inc. v. 1664092 Ontario Inc., 2014 ONSC 4825

[12] I have also considered the factors relating to deterrence and denunciation on the facts before me. I find that those factors weigh against 1664092 as the contemnor, and Mr. Grit as the sole officer, director and controlling mind of that corporation. A significant sanction against 1664092 in the form of a fine and a term of incarceration for Mr. Grit would seem the only way to enforce compliance with the orders breached, and to send a message to the general public that open defiance of court orders shall not be tolerated.

[13] I am mindful of Mr. Mishra’s submissions I’ve permitted him to make so that he could fulfill his ethical duty to his absentee client. He called my attention to the case of Chiang (and Trustee of) v. Chiang, [2009] O.J. 41 where the Court of Appeal observed that custodial sentences for civil contempt are rare, and that ordinarily incarceration is a sanction of last resort. Mr. Mishra also points to a quote in the Mercedes Benz decision from a commentary published in 2001 by the Canadian Judicial Council titled “Some Guideline on the use of Contempt Powers” that supports a lenient approach when deciding a sentence for civil contempt. However, Justice Brown in the Mercedes Benz decision pointed out that sentences imposed by Ontario courts in recent years do not show a tendency for leniency where the contemnor has engaged in a lengthy display of disobedience and has not purged his contempt.

3. Hodge v. Neinstein, 2014 ONSC 4503

[13] The fatal flaw of Ms. Hodge’s attempt to obtain access to justice is that while an identifiable group may have been victimized by the Respondents – which remains to be proven – the clients would have been victimized as individuals.

[14] A class proceeding is not the appropriate procedure to obtain access to justice for a group of individual claimants without a commonality other than the possibility of having been victimized by the same villain or group of villains. I agree with the Respondents that each Class Member’s claim of a breach of the Solicitors Act requires an independent fact specific assessment that cannot be done at a common issues trial. I agree that very little, if anything, would be carried forward from a common issues trial to advance the Class Member’s individual claims.

The most-consulted French-language decision was Tremblay c. Daigle, [1989] 2 RCS 530

L’injonction doit être annulée parce que les droits substantifs invoqués pour l’appuyer ‑‑ les droits du f{oe}tus ou les droits du père en puissance ‑‑ n’existent pas.

Le f{oe}tus n’est pas compris dans le terme “être humain” employé dans la Charte québécoise et, par conséquent, ne jouit pas du droit à la vie conféré par son art. 1. La Charte québécoise, prise dans son ensemble, ne traduit aucune intention manifeste de la part du législateur de prendre en considération le statut du f{oe}tus. La formulation de la Charte est très générale. Elle ne parle ni du f{oe}tus ni de droits du f{oe}tus; de plus, elle ne définit pas les termes “être humain” et “personne”. Cette absence d’intention de traiter du statut du f{oe}tus milite elle‑même fortement contre la conclusion que la Charte québécoise confère des droits au f{oe}tus. Si le législateur avait voulu accorder au f{oe}tus le droit à la vie, il est peu probable qu’il eût laissé la protection de ce droit dans une telle incertitude. Ainsi que le démontre le présent litige, le prétendu droit à la vie du f{oe}tus ne serait protégé qu’à la demande discrétionnaire de tiers.

* As of January 2014 we measure the total amount of time spent on the pages rather than simply the number of hits; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.