Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII? – November 2025

Each month, we tell you which three English-language cases and French-language cases have been the most viewed* on CanLII in the previous month and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about. For this past month, the three most-consulted English-language decisions were: 1 . Nootchtai v. Nahwegahbow Corbiere Genoodmagejig Barristers and Solicitors, 2025 ONSC 6071

[11] The issue before me in this proceeding is whether the Legal Team, as licensed legal professionals and members of the bar of Ontario, are entitled to a whopping $510,000,000.00 as a 5% contingent fee on the $10 billion settlement under the terms of a Partial Contingency Fee Agreement with the Fund dated June 17, 2011.

[12] The applicants represent two of the 21 First Nations and their members who are beneficiaries of the Fund. They submit that the fees claimed by the Legal Team are too high and must be reduced despite approval by the Fund Trustees and Chiefs representing the large majority of the Robinson Huron First Nations and their members.

[…]

[194] I find that the Chiefs did not fully appreciate the nature of the agreement that they executed. They believed that the deal was that in return for the lawyers bearing 50% of the projected litigation cost, the Fund would pay a 5% contingency fee after the first $100 million was paid at 15%. They did not appreciate that the agreement did not limit their funding obligations to 50%. They also did not understand that the amount of the contingent fee was always subject to assessment without in any way undermining the sanctity of the parties’ commitments to each other.

[195] No one told them that the draft agreement was champertous from the outset.

[…]

[242] In Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 3429, at para. 51, Belobaba J wrote:

Mega-fund cases are rare and when they settle, and almost all of them settle, the size of the settlement fund can be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. A percentage of the fund approach, given economies of scale, will result in windfalls. Windfalls should be avoided because class action litigation is not a lottery and the CPA was not enacted to make lawyers wealthy. [Notes omitted.]

[243] I adopt these important words. In this case, the Legal Team is seeking generational wealth at the expense of the 40,000 beneficiaries whom they serve. That is not reasonable and it shines no honour upon them.

[244] Based on time, complexity, and result, high fees are deserved. Based on the key factor of risk, a lower reward is apt. Combined with an assessment of proportionality between the fee claimed and the settlement amount as discussed in Fresco, the disproportionate windfall claimed by the Legal Team under the Partial Contingency Fee Agreement is unreasonable.

[245] The Partial Contingency Fee Agreement is therefore unenforceable.

(Check for related commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Binance Holdings Limited v. Ontario Securities Commission, 2025 ONCA 751

AI-generated summary:

Facts: Binance Holdings Limited, a Cayman Islands-based crypto asset trading platform, operated in Ontario without registration or exemption under the Securities Act. Despite assurances to the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) that it would cease operations in Ontario and restrict Ontario accounts, Binance continued to allow trading by Ontario users. The OSC launched an investigation into Binance’s alleged regulatory non-compliance, issuing a summons for extensive documents and information. Binance challenged the summons, claiming it was overbroad and unconstitutional.

Procedural History: Capital Markets Tribunal, June 7, 2023: Found it lacked jurisdiction under s. 144(1) of the Securities Act to revoke or vary the summons. Divisional Court, June 26, 2023: Justice Leiper denied Binance’s application to stay the summons pending judicial review. Divisional Court, September 28, 2023: Denied Binance’s judicial review application, declining to address the constitutional validity of the summons. Ontario Securities Commission, April 30, 2024: Found it lacked jurisdiction under s. 144(1) of the Securities Act to revoke or vary the summons.

Parties’ Submissions: Appellant (Binance): Argued the summons was overbroad, unconstitutional under s. 8 of the Charter, and beyond the authority granted under s. 13 of the Securities Act. Claimed the OSC failed to balance Charter rights and statutory objectives as required by Doré. Respondent (Ontario Securities Commission): Asserted the summons was lawful, relevant to its investigation, and proportionate to its regulatory objectives. Denied that s. 13 of the Securities Act required a relevance limitation or that the summons violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Legal Issues: Did the Commission err in finding it lacked jurisdiction under s. 144(1) of the Securities Act to revoke or vary the summons? Did the Divisional Court err in declining to set aside the denial of the stay pending judicial review? Did the Divisional Court err in declining judicial review of the Charter arguments? Was the summons an unreasonable seizure under s. 8 of the Charter? Did the summons exceed the authority provided under s. 13 of the Securities Act? Was the discretion to issue the summons exercised reasonably?

Disposition: The appeal was allowed in part. The summons was found to be unconstitutionally overbroad and set aside.
The documents seized under the invalid summons were ordered to be returned to Binance.

Reasons: Per Paciocco J.A. (Miller and Coroza JJ.A. concurring): Jurisdiction under s. 144(1): The Commission correctly found it lacked jurisdiction to revoke or vary the summons under s. 144(1) of the Securities Act. The summons was issued by an investigator, not the Commission, and thus was not a “decision of the Commission”. Stay of proceedings: The Divisional Court did not err in dismissing Binance’s motion to set aside the denial of the stay. There is no constitutional right to challenge a regulatory production order before compliance, and judicial oversight is merely a factor in assessing reasonableness under s. 8. Judicial review of Charter arguments: The Divisional Court erred in declining judicial review of the Charter arguments. It improperly relied on the mere possibility of an alternative remedy without determining whether such a remedy existed or was adequate. Unreasonable seizure under s. 8: The summons was unconstitutionally overbroad, demanding all communications from Binance and its related entities across Canada without sufficient relevance to the OSC’s investigation. This constituted an unreasonable seizure under s. 8 of the Charter. Authority under s. 13: The summons was ambiguous in its demands for information rather than documents, raising concerns about exceeding the authority granted under s. 13 of the Securities Act. However, the issue was resolved by the Commission’s concession that it sought only documents. Discretion under Doré: The Doré framework does not apply to s. 8 Charter challenges, as s. 8 already provides a dedicated methodology for assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures. The issuance of the summons must comply with s. 8 requirements, not a proportionality analysis under Doré.

(Check for related commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Universal Ostrich Farms Inc. v. Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FC 878

[133] As previewed in the beginning of this section, I do not need to resolve the parties’ battle over the admissibility and weight of their expert material. The dispute they invite the Court to referee is, in substance, a contest over whose science on the virus in question is “better” and therefore whose preferred animal and public health policy is “wiser.” To decide a winner in this contest will cause this Court to commit two cardinal sins in reasonableness review. First, it will prompt this Court to reach beyond the legitimate scope of reasonableness review of a broad policy decision. Second, it will effectively make this Court an academy of science and an arbiter of truth in immunology and animal and public health.

[134] To reiterate, under Vavilov, this Court’s task on this judicial review is to decide whether the Stamping-Out Policy, when read considering its enabling statute, falls within a range of outcomes that can be said to be rational, intelligible and justified. As the Federal Court of Appeal explained in Entertainment Software, decisions “very much unconstrained” by tight statutory language or adjudicative methodology, namely policy decisions with broad public interest implications, are correspondingly “harder to set aside” because merits-based disagreement is not a ground for intervention. The Stamping-Out Policy under review is precisely of that character. Like the policy decisions examined in South Shore and Kohl, it is a preventative, nationwide disease-control measure adopted to proactively manage and eradicate a serious threat to animal and public health, as well as international trade. As Auer teaches us, for such decisions, the reviewing court asks whether the policy can plausibly be located within the text, purpose and architecture of the Act, not whether it represents the optimal balance of virological, economic, or public health considerations.

[…]

[157] I agree with the Respondent that the Stamping-Out Policy is reasonable in law, for it aligns with the text, structure, and purpose of the Act. As explained in the Legal Framework section, Parliament has delegated broad power to the Minister and their delegates under section 48 to protect public health and preserve the health of humans and animals in Canada as well as Canada’s international trade status by proactively preventing and controlling animal disease outbreaks and reducing the risk of zoonotic transmission. The Stamping-Out Policy represents a legitimate policy-level exercise of this discretion, grounded in a science-informed framework that mandates swift depopulation following laboratory confirmation of H5 avian influenza. The Policy is further operationalized by measures aimed at halting viral amplification, permitting sanitization of affected premises, and facilitating the rapid restoration of disease-free status. Additionally, the CFIA complements these measures by providing operators with post-depopulation biosecurity guidance tailored to minimize future infection risks, further promoting the Act’s proactive approach to disease control.

[…]

[162] I cannot accept the Applicant’s positions. Both of the Applicant’s core policy-level criticisms invite this Court to engage in precisely the kind of assessment that Vavilov, Entertainment Software, South Shore, Kohl, and Auer say reviewing courts must not do: arbitrating scientific disputes, reassessing social and economic trade-offs, and pronouncing on the empirical effectiveness of broad public-interest policies. Those are tasks that are better left to the agencies like the CFIA that wield administrative and technical expertise. This Court’s role, by contrast, is confined to determining whether the CFIA’s Stamping-Out Policy fits rationally within the Act’s text, scheme, and purpose, given the legal and factual constraints that bear on the Minister and their delegates. It is not to decide whether the CFIA’s chosen balance of virology, trade protection, public-health precaution and animal-health logistics is the best or the most up-to-date, or whether the Applicant’s proposed policy changes are the better or more up-to-date ones.

(Check for related commentary on CanLII Connects)

*** The three most-consulted French-language decisions were: 1. Demers c. Amyot, 2023 QCCS 4043

[41] Enfin et toujours sans se prononcer sur le fond de l’affaire, l’examen des prétentions du demandeur suivant lesquelles les décisions ne sont pas motivées ne paraissent prima facie pas sérieuses.

[42] Une lecture des décisions permet de constater qu’elles incluent une analyse et une réflexion intellectuelles intelligibles ainsi que des conclusions soutenues par de nombreux motifs. Les décisions comportent ainsi suffisamment d’éléments organisés de manière logique qui permettent à [le demandeur], quoiqu’il soit en désaccord avec celles-ci, de comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles on révoque son certificat d’immatriculation et lui retire sa carte de stages.

[43] Premièrement, les raisons pour lesquelles on retient que [le demandeur] « module les faits, dit des demi-vérités et ment » sont manifestes. En appréciant l’ensemble des faits, dont ceux consignés par des tiers dans les dossiers médicaux, et les versions différentes données par le demandeur, la syndique adjointe et le Comité des requêtes ont remis en doute sa parole et ont conclu qu’il n’était ni transparent ni honnête.

[44] Deuxièmement, il est inexact de prétendre, comme le fait le demandeur, que les rapports en toxicomanies et en psychiatrie sont écartés sans raison apparente dans les décisions. En effet, les expertises sont abordées, exposées et font partie de l’analyse de la Dre Amyot et du Comité des requêtes. Les conclusions des deux experts sont prises en compte et soupesées avec les autres éléments au dossier. Dans cet exercice, le Comité des requêtes précise et explique que même si les experts ne concluent pas à un trouble de consommation de substances ou à une inaptitude à exercer la médecine, il importe d’aller au-delà des diagnostics et des pathologies et de se pencher sur l’attitude et les comportements du demandeur. C’est ainsi qu’au terme de l’analyse, le Comité conclut que l’attitude et les comportements de [le demandeur] ne sont pas ceux attendus de la part d’un médecin, le tout, sans égard à sa capacité d’exercer.

[45] Enfin, le demandeur allègue que les décisions n’expliquent pas pourquoi il n’est pas accommodé plutôt que puni compte tenu de sa condition médicale. De plus, le Comité des requêtes ne répond pas à son argument sur le caractère déficient de l’enquête du Bureau du syndic qu’il a pourtant soulevé comme préoccupation principale.

[46] Or, il arrive que certains arguments ne soient pas abordés nommément dans une décision, mais que leur traitement s’inscrit tout de même dans le cheminement intellectuel suivi par le décideur et découle de ses conclusions. La Cour d’appel rappelle que « l’implicite a forcément sa place dans le jugement ».

[47] En l’espèce, il est clair que le Comité des requêtes est parvenu à la révocation du certificat d’immatriculation et au retrait de la carte de stages du demandeur en raison de l’appréciation qu’il a faite des manquements du résident. Les constats du Comité sur la gravité et la récurrence de ces manquements ainsi que sur l’incapacité du demandeur à changer son comportement expliquent qu’il n’ait pas retenu l’option qui lui était proposée des mesures d’encadrement et d’accompagnement.

[48] Finalement, il se dégage implicitement de la décision du Comité des requêtes que l’argument du demandeur selon lequel la conduite de l’enquête par la syndique adjointe était défaillante et devait être remise en question n’a simplement pas été retenu. En effet, le Comité des requêtes choisit plutôt de s’appuyer sur plusieurs faits issus de l’enquête de la Dre Amyot et de retenir ses recommandations ce qui laisse comprendre qu’il a estimé son travail fiable, exhaustif et pertinent.

(Check for related commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Pharmaciens (Ordre professionnel des) c. Wen, 2025 QCCDPHA 25

[87] La jurisprudence reconnaît que le pharmacien a « un rôle pivot à jouer dans le traitement de la santé ». Exécuter une ordonnance constitue l’abécédaire de la profession de pharmacien.

[88] Quant à l’infraction prévue au chef 1, le Conseil constate que l’intimé a eu des occasions de se rendre compte qu’une erreur avait été commise, mais qu’il ne les a pas saisies avant que la mère de l’enfant ne quitte la pharmacie avec le mauvais médicament. Les premiers questionnements de Mme A lorsqu’elle a vu la couleur des capsules auraient dû entraîner une vérification en règle de la part de l’intimé.

[89] N’eût été la vigilance de la mère de l’enfant, peut-être plus alerte que la moyenne des patients en raison de son expérience passée de travail comme technicienne en pharmacie, le mauvais médicament aurait été administré à un enfant vulnérable.

[90] L’intimé a présenté ses excuses à la mère lorsqu’elle s’est présentée à la pharmacie pour récupérer le bon médicament, et a collaboré pleinement à l’enquête. Le Conseil ne doute pas de la sincérité des remords et des excuses de l’intimé et constate que celui-ci a été affecté par le processus qui a eu un effet dissuasif sur lui.

[91] Le patient ne doit évidemment pas faire les frais de la fatigue et de la charge de travail de son pharmacien ni d’un fort achalandage de la pharmacie. Le fait qu’un transfert de l’ordonnance s’ajoute aux tâches à effectuer ne constitue pas non plus une excuse. Le pharmacien doit s’assurer de demeurer concentré lorsqu’il vérifie et exécute une ordonnance. Le Conseil ne saurait trop insister pour que l’intimé fasse preuve de vigilance afin qu’une telle situation ne se reproduise plus.

[92] Quant à l’infraction visée par le second chef, le Conseil rappelle que le pharmacien ne doit pas accepter des médicaments inutilisés retournés à la pharmacie pour d’autres fins que leur destruction. Une telle obligation s’impose pour s’assurer de l’intégrité des médicaments qui seront éventuellement servis à la clientèle. Le pharmacien ne peut se porter garant des conditions dans lesquelles un patient, ayant retourné les médicaments, les a conservés et manipulés.

[93] N’étant pas pharmacien-propriétaire, l’intimé n’a pas tiré un avantage financier du fait qu’il a remis les médicaments dans leur contenant d’origine, mais le tout n’excuse pas la commission d’une infraction qui est objectivement grave.

[94] Par conséquent, le Conseil impose à l’intimé, sur les deux chefs de la plainte, les sanctions ainsi que les modalités de celles-ci suggérées conjointement par les parties.

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3. Québec (Procureur général) c. Senneville, 2025 CSC 33