Summaries Sunday: Supreme Advocacy

One Sunday each month we bring you a summary from Supreme Advocacy LLP of recent decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada. Supreme Advocacy LLP offers a weekly electronic newsletter, Supreme Advocacy Letter, to which you may subscribe. It’s a summary of all Appeals, Oral Judgments and Leaves to Appeal granted from April 18 – June 25, 2026 inclusive.

Appeal

Civil Litigation/Elections: Collateral Attack; Abuse of Process; Parliamentary Privilege; Immunity
Resler v. Anglin, 2024 ABCA 113; 2026 SCC 23 (41298)

Can an unsuccessful election candidate bring a civil claim against an elections officer for the tort of misfeasance in public office? The claim herein does not constitute a collateral attack on the 2015 election result or an abuse of process, there is an arguable case for the non-application of parliamentary privilege and statutory immunity, and the rigorous test for striking out a claim is not met. Accordingly, the order of the majority of the Court of Appeal is upheld. The civil claim, with the exception of the malicious prosecution claim that was struck and was not the subject of a cross-appeal, may proceed.

Civil Litigation/Mortgages: Res Judicata; Cause of Action Estoppel
Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. v. 11368 NL Inc., 2024 NLCA 11; 2026 SCC 15 (41296) May 8, 2026

Because cause of action estoppel provides a full answer to this appeal, it is unnecessary to address 11368’s arguments respecting the applicability of issue estoppel and abuse of process by relitigation to the facts herein. The test for cause of action estoppel: (a) There is a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in the prior action; (b) The parties to the subsequent litigation were parties to or in privy with parties to the prior action; (c) The cause of action in the prior action is not separate and distinct; and (d) The basis of the cause of action and the subsequent action was argued or could have been argued in the prior action if the parties had exercised reasonable diligence.

Constitutional Law: Charter; Language Rights
Société de l’Acadie du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2024 NBCA 7; 2026 SCC 22 (41398)

Section 16(2) of the Charter enshrines a mandatory guarantee of substantive equality for the two official languages in New Brunswick’s institutions. Section 16(2) protects both the possibility of using either official language in the province’s institutions and the equality of status of these two languages. This equality cannot be preserved when the position of Lieutenant Governor of the province, a unipersonal and highly symbolic institution, is held by a unilingual person, a situation that necessarily gives predominance to the majority language, English. The appropriate remedy is to issue a declaration affirming that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who does not have the ability to understand, communicate in and perform their functions in both official languages infringes s. 16(2) of the Charter.

Constitutional Law: Parliamentary Privilege
Alford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 306; 2026 SCC 14 (41336) May 1, 2026

In 2017, Parliament enacted the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15 (“NSICOP Act”) for the purpose of setting up a statutory committee of parliamentarians to oversee Canada’s national security and intelligence apparatus (“Committee”). Section 12 of this Act contains a provision that prohibits parliamentarians who sat on the Committee from claiming immunity based on parliamentary privilege in a proceeding against them related to the disclosure of national security information obtained through their Committee membership. Due to the nature of parliamentary privilege in Canadian constitutional law; the interpretation of s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, in light of its text, historical and constitutional context, and purpose; and considering whether s. 12 of the NSICOP Act falls within the scope of s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867; the S.C.C. held that s. 12 of the NSICOP Act was validly enacted under the legislative authority conferred on Parliament by s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 18 gives Parliament the authority to define its privileges, subject only to the limits of its text and purpose, as understood within the broader context of the Constitution. This authority includes limiting these privileges. When Parliament does so, it exercises a legislative authority conferred by the Constitution; it does not amend the Constitution itself.

Constitutional Law: Right to Vote
Québec (Attorney General) v. Lalande, 2025 QCCA 1558; 2026 SCC 13 (42152) Apr. 22, 2026; May 1, 2026

The determination made by the first instance judge concerning the infringement of s. 3 of the Charter has not been appealed to this Court. The appeal by A.G. Qué. relates solely to the justification for this infringement under s. 1 of the Charter. Since the appellant has not shown any reviewable error by the Qué. C.A. the appeal is dismissed. Contrary to what the appellant argues, the Qué. C.A. did not unduly narrow the pressing and substantial objective accepted by the first instance judge and did not depart from the factual findings derived from the evidence relating to what the appellant describes as a [translation] “persistent phenomenon of devitalization of certain remote regions” (outline of argument, at para. 3.2b)). Moreover, the pressing and substantial objective urged by the appellant would not meet the further rational connection requirement. At the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test, the appellant argued that the alternative solution identified by the Qué. C.A. would not render it possible to achieve the legislature’s objectives in a real and substantial manner. The S.C.C. rejected that argument: it is true that the state is accorded a measure of deference at the minimal impairment stage (Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 53); in addition, depending on the circumstances, the unanimity of a legislative assembly may help to demonstrate that electoral reform was enacted in good faith rather than for purely partisan purposes. However, the mere fact that the ATI was passed unanimously by the National Assembly is not here a determinative consideration that shields the ATI from constitutional scrutiny and relieves the appellant of his burden, under s. 1 of the Charter, of demonstrating that the law has been “carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary” (RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160, cited by Qué. C.A., at para. 78).

Criminal Law: Delay; Case Complexity Analysis
R. v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151; 2026 SCC 19(41741) Dec. 4, 2025; May 29, 2026

To the extent that jurisprudential and legislative developments in the past decade have increased the complexity of criminal trials, the Jordan framework can comfortably respond. This is not an appropriate case in which to consider more fundamental changes to the Jordan ceilings or to revisit the remedy for a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter. Instead, this appeal offers an opportunity to clarify how the exceptional circumstance of particular complexity can justify delay in excess of a Jordan ceiling.The case complexity exception recognizes that certain cases, because of their inherent time requirements, cannot reasonably be completed within the presumptive ceilings. The exception applies to cases that are “particularly complex” because the nature of the evidence or issues requires an inordinate amount of preparation or trial time (Jordan, at para. 77). However, the exception will not apply where the Crown has failed to develop and follow a concrete plan to minimize delay associated with a case’s complexity (para. 79). Case complexity involves a qualitative rather than a quantitative assessment; it does not result in the deduction of any specific period of delay (R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659, at para. 64). Where net delay exceeds the relevant presumptive ceiling after defence delay and any discrete exceptional circumstances have been accounted for, a case’s particular complexity may justify the time it has taken. The case complexity exception is sufficiently flexible to account for changes in the average complexity of criminal trials.

Criminal Law: Delay; Joint Trials
R. v. Jacques-Taylor, 2024 ONCA 458; 2026 SCC 20(41430) May 29, 2025

Delays flowing from the Crown’s decision to conduct a joint prosecution may, sometimes, amount to discrete exceptional circumstances. In the instant case, the delay caused by the unavailability of the co‑accused’s counsel amounts to a discrete exceptional circumstance. It should therefore be deducted from the net delay. This brings the total delay to under 18 months, rendering it presumptively reasonable.

Criminal Law: Forfeiture
R. v. Nguyen, 2024 QCCA 674; 2026 SCC 10(41400) Apr. 17, 2026

This matter is remanded to the Court of Québec, which does have jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal forfeiture hearing herein. First, the stay of the trial proceedings is not, for the purposes of the forfeiture matter, tantamount to an acquittal. The stay may be equated to an acquittal for the purposes of the plea of autrefois acquit and the exercise of appeal rights because they engage a person’s risk of criminal liability and liberty interests. But the stay has no decisive effect on the forfeiture proceedings. The matters required to establish that the property is criminally tainted were not decided in the respondents’ favour in a prior criminal proceeding, such that it is open to the Crown to lead evidence on those issues to support its forfeiture application. There is no necessary issue estoppel between matters decided on the stay — whether the delay was unreasonable — and matters at issue in subsequent forfeiture proceedings — whether the property is tainted by crime. The stay does not oust statutory jurisdiction in respect of forfeiture. Second, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court of Québec does not have the power in the instant case to order forfeiture under the principal provisions invoked by the Crown in the Criminal Code and the CDSA, which tie that authority to trial and sentencing proceedings. Jurisdiction to conduct criminal forfeiture proceedings survives under statutory rules that operate independently of trial and sentencing. Parliament has provided for a number of circumstances in which forfeiture can be ordered even where no accused has been tried.

Criminal Law: Hearsay
R. v. Saddleback, 2024 ABCA 352; 2026 SCC 18(41567) Nov. 1, 2024; May 22, 2026

In brief oral reasons, the trial judge convicted the respondent of second degree murder. In support of his conclusion that the two men were left alone at the crime scene shortly before the murder, the trial judge referenced an out-of-court statement made by the deceased during a phone call with a witness. A majority of the Alta. C.A. concluded the trial judge erred in relying on the statement for an impermissible hearsay purpose and, on this basis, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial. Based on a plain reading of the trial reasons, the trial judge used the out-of-court statement as hearsay, that is, to make proof of the truth of its contents. Even if it were true that the out-of-court statement could have been relied on for a purpose other than establishing the truth of its contents or could have been admissible to prove the truth of its contents under a hearsay exception, the trial judge’s reasons, read in light of the trial record as a whole, are insufficient to allow an appellate court to infer or reconstruct an analysis supporting either basis. It is noted the Crown does not rely on the curative proviso. In the circumstances, a new trial is required.

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Alibi
R. v. G.G., 2025 ONCA 574; 2026 SCC 12 (41963) Aug. 1, 2025; Mar. 20, 2026;

The S.C.C. agreed with the Ont. C.A. that herein the time period alleged by the Crown concerned the last sexual encounter between the appellant and the complainant on or about April 7, which they agreed happened on the last night they slept in the marital home together. This period was defined by the language of the charging document, the substance of the complainant’s evidence, the evidence elicited by the Crown, and the Crown’s position at trial, taken together. In these circumstances, the complainant’s estimate of when the sexual assault occurred, elicited by the defence in cross-examination, did not narrow the Crown’s case to that specific period. As a result, the Crown did not shift the alleged time frame or deny the appellant the right to make full answer and defence by maintaining that it was not required to prove that the sexual assault occurred around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. on April 7. Put simply, the Crown never claimed that it did occur at that time. And the Court agreed that substituting a conviction was the appropriate remedy. Under s. 686(4)(b)(ii) an appellate court can set aside an acquittal and enter a conviction where “the trial judge’s findings of fact, viewed in light of the applicable law, supported a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt” (R. v. Katigbak, 2011 SCC 48, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 326, at para. 50). That standard was met in this case.

Criminal Law: Sexual Assault; Conflicting Evidence
R. v. Berg, 2025 SKCA 85; 2026 SCC 21(41980) April 14, 2026; June 5, 2026

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed Mr. Berg’s appeal. There, and herein, Mr. Berg argued that the trial judge made two reversible errors. First, the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony. Second, he failed to assess the complainant’s testimony in light of the totality of the evidence and erroneously used it to reject Mr. Berg’s account. The Sask. C.A. convincingly explained how the trial judge convicted Mr. Berg based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. An outright rejection of an accused’s evidence based on a considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of conflicting credible evidence is as much an explanation for the rejection of an accused’s evidence as is a rejection based on a problem identified with the way the accused testified or the substance of the accused’s evidence. As a general rule, trial judges should not rely on J.J.R.D. (2006) 218 O.A.C. 37 when structuring their W. (D.) analyses or when providing W. (D.) directions to a jury. J.J.R.D. is a case about appellate review for sufficiency of reasons and it does not purport to set out a formula for performing a W. (D.) analysis. It was intended to apply to appellate review of trial decisions when assessing whether the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient to permit appellate review, not to be applied by trial judges themselves.

Torts: Intimate Partner Violence
Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2023 ONCA 476; 2026 SCC 16 (41061) July 7, 2023; May 15, 2026

On the strength of the facts and Ms. Ahluwalia’s pleadings, the S.C.C. recognized a tort of “intimate partner violence”. To establish liability under this new tort, a plaintiff must prove three elements: first, that the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath; second, that the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and third, that the conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control. Proof of these three elements suffices to establish that the plaintiff has suffered a dignitary harm (see generally Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Ari, 2025 BCCA 131, 46 C.C.L.I. (6th) 173, at para. 32). Harm flows from proof of the intentional wrong because coercive control directly interferes with the plaintiff’s legal interests in dignity, autonomy, and equality within an intimate partnership. The extent of that harm may warrant a greater or lesser quantum of damages, depending on the circumstances.

Oral Judgment

Criminal Law: Fresh Evidence
R. v. Maadani, 2025 ONCA 582; 2026 SCC 11 (41972) Judgment rendered April 17, 2026

“The Chief Justice: “A majority of this Court is of the view that Huscroft J.A., writing for the majority of the Court of Appeal, made no reviewable error in dismissing the application for new evidence for lack of cogency. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Justices Karakatsanis and Côté would have allowed the appeal. They are of the view that, in its cogency analysis, the majority erred in law in making its own determination of the witness’s ultimate credibility. The majority also erred in its analysis of due diligence. Justices Karakatsanis and Côté agree with Copeland J.A. that the fresh evidence was reasonably capable of belief by the triers of fact on key points relating to self-defence and would have admitted the fresh evidence and would have ordered a new trial.”

Leaves to Appeal Granted

Agriculture: Fertilizers
Biogénie Canada Inc. v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2025 FCA 150 (42060) May 28, 2026

Federal regulations re fertilizer composition.

Charter: Language Rights
Forum des maires de la Péninsule acadienne Inc. v. Minister of Justice and Public Safety, 2025 NBCA 99 (42073) May 28, 2026

Language rights re court services.

Class Actions: Road Disturbances
Belmamoun, et al. v. Ville de Brossard, et al., 2025 QCCA 1011 (42047) Apr. 30, 2026

Class action issues re municipal roads.

Corporate Litigation: Derivative Actions
Hougen Co. Ltd. v. Su, et al., 2025 BCCA 164 (41946) May 28, 2026

Issues, including limitations, in derivative action.

Criminal Law: Failure to Blow
R.v. Emereuwa, 2025 SKCA 83 (42075) May 28, 2026

Offence elements of failing to blow.

Criminal Law: Homicide
R. v. Dussault, 2025 QCCA 1433 (42169) May 14, 2026

There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of homicide.

Criminal Law: State Agents
R. v. Pham, 2025 BCCA 324 (42101) May 21, 2026

Courier depot employees as state agents.

Criminal Law: Theft; Sentencing
Wood v. R., 2025 ONCA 746 (42127) Apr. 30, 2026

Sentencing principles for theft offences.

Elections: Returning Officer Appointments
Canada (Attorney General) v. Drover, 2025 ONCA 468 (42005)

Constitutionality of Canada Election Act re returning officer appointments.

Judicial Independence: Special Clerks & Bankruptcy Registrars
Québec (Attorney General) v. Petrishki, et al., 2025 QCCA 893 (42018) Apr. 30, 2026

Constitutionality of judicial independence re special clerks and bankruptcy registrars.

Mining/Aboriginal Law: Duty to Consult
British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner) v. Gitxaala Nation, et al., 2025 BCCA 430 (42200) May 21, 2026

Duty to consult; justiciability of U.N. Declaration.

Professions: Pharmacists
Haggaï v. Loiselle, 2025 QCCA 932 (41976) May 7, 2026

There is a publication ban in this case, in the context of alleged professional disciplinary complaints against a pharmacist.

Securities: Constitutionality of Summons
Ontario Securities Commission v. Binance Holdings Limited, 2025 ONCA 751 (42156) May 21, 2026

Constitutionality of Security Commission summons.

Torts: Malicious Prosecution
McCormack v. Evans, et al., 2025 ONCA 767 (42170) May 21, 2026

Wrongful prosecution, negligent investigation, and other civil torts.