Wednesday: What’s Hot on CanLII

Each Wednesday we tell you which three English-language cases and which French-language case have been the most viewed* on CanLII and we give you a small sense of what the cases are about.

For this last week:

1. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. O’Connor, 2022 ONSC 195

[61] Without some anonymizing of doctors who come forward in an effort to assist the medical community at large by assisting the regulator, the Applicant may be unable to operate efficiently and effectively: Osif v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia, 2008 NSCA 113, at para. 23. That is not to say that the identity of physicians who act as sources of information is to be withheld from the Respondents themselves (who have a right to know their accusers). But there is no overriding reason for the public at large to know the identities of individual doctors assisting the Applicant at this stage.

[62] Finally, the Applicant seeks non-publication Orders with respect to the identities of its own investigative staff and of Dr. X, the Medical Officer of Health who instigated some of the subject investigations. As public sector personnel and public officials engaged in the enforcement activity of a regulatory body, I view this request in a different light than the request with respect to private physicians lending their expertise to the Applicant. Public sector investigators, lawyers, and medical officers must bear a higher level of public accountability in carrying out their duties.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

2. Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (CanLII), [2014] 3 SCR 494

[1] The key issues on this appeal come down to two straightforward questions: Does Canadian common law impose a duty on parties to perform their contractual obligations honestly? And, if so, did either of the respondents breach that duty? I would answer both questions in the affirmative. Finding that there is a duty to perform contracts honestly will make the law more certain, more just and more in tune with reasonable commercial expectations. It will also bring a measure of justice to the appellant, Mr. Bhasin, who was misled and lost the value of his business as a result.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

3. Driving Force Inc v I Spy-Eagle Eyes Safety Inc, 2022 ABCA 25

[64] While it is recognized that corporations can only act through their human agents, and often a corporate tort will involve those human agents, concurrent liability is not always appropriate. There is no fixed rule that a tort by a corporation always involves a concurrent tort by one of its human agents. Further, “control” of the corporation does not necessarily mean there was personal involvement in the tort. However, to date no unifying test has been identified for determining when concurrent personal liability will be imposed for corporate torts: Hall v Stewart, 2019 ABCA 98 at para. 18, 82 Alta LR (6th) 233, citing Hogarth v Rocky Mountain Slate Inc., 2013 ABCA 57 at paras. 112-3, 75 Alta LR (5th) 295, 542 AR 289; S. O’Byrne, Y. Philip, K. Fraser, The Tortious Liability of Directors and Officers to Third Parties in Common Law Canada (2017), 54:4 Alta L Rev 871 at pp. 871, 875; M. Khimji, C. Nicholls, Piercing the Corporate Veil Reframed as Evasion and Concealment (2015), 48 UBC L Rev 401 at paras. 1-3.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

The most-consulted French-language decision was Bricka c. Procureur général du Québec, 2022 QCCA 85

[27] En l’espèce, tel que le retient le juge de première instance, l’article 119 LSP n’est pas ambigu et permet le renouvellement des décrets d’urgence sanitaire aux six à dix jours. Plusieurs arguments appuient la conclusion à laquelle il en est arrivé.

[28] En effet, le législateur, à l’article 119, indique que le gouvernement peut déclarer l’état d’urgence sanitaire « pour une période maximale de 10 jours à l’expiration de laquelle il peut être renouvelé pour d’autres périodes maximales de 10 jours […] ». Outre l’existence d’une menace grave à la santé de la population, réelle ou imminente, nécessitant la déclaration d’un état d’urgence, le législateur ne pose qu’une seule autre condition, soit la durée maximale de dix jours. S’il avait voulu que le gouvernement obtienne l’assentiment de l’Assemblée nationale dès que la durée totale des décrets atteint 30 jours, il l’aurait prévu expressément. Par exemple, il aurait pu écrire que « [l]’ état d’urgence […] vaut pour une période maximale de 10 jours à l’expiration de laquelle il peut être renouvelé pour deux autres périodes maximales de 10 jours […] ». Cela aurait indiqué que les décrets d’une durée maximale de dix jours ne peuvent être renouvelés sans limite de temps. Or, ce n’est pas ce que l’article 119 LSP édicte. Il laisse l’alternative au gouvernement de prendre des décrets d’une durée maximale de dix jours ou, à son choix, de prendre un décret plus long, d’une durée maximale de 30 jours, avec l’assentiment de l’Assemblée nationale.

(Check for commentary on CanLII Connects)

* As of January 2014 we measure the total amount of time spent on the pages rather than simply the number of hits; as well, a case once mentioned won’t appear again for three months.