Law Society Discipline of Lawyer-Politicians: Lessons From Law Society of Alberta v Shandro

The decision of the Law Society of Alberta in Law Society of Alberta v Shandro (2024 ABLS 14) has received media attention, but primarily for the result. In the process of dismissing three citations against politician Tyler Shandro, the Hearing Committee panel makes some important points about politicians who happen to be lawyers – points that are worthy of more attention independent of the result in the specific matter.

It seems intuitive that law society regulation, including complaints and discipline, could be ‘weaponized’ or otherwise abused as a tool against lawyer-politicians.[1] At the same time, it does not necessarily follow that because of this risk lawyer-politicians should never be the subjects of law society regulation. Indeed, lawyer-politicians tend to be some of the most visible lawyers in the country. It seems unavoidable that their conduct as politicians may well impact the public perception of, and trust in, the legal profession. As the dissenting panel member in Shandro put it, “At the time, Mr. Shandro was a very public member of Government, known publicly to be a lawyer with cabinet positions …. The conduct is damaging to the reputation of lawyers and negatively affects the public perception of lawyers.”[2] The issues in Shandro likewise raise bigger questions about the adverse effects of law society regulation of any non-practicing lawyers, such as journalists or pundits.[3] That robust policy debate – like the related debate about civility – is a matter for legislatures and law societies, one that any given disciplinary panel would be poorly situated to resolve.

So how does and should the partisan motivation, or the apparent partisan motivation, of a complaint affect the manner in which a law society addresses that complaint? Given the rules of professional conduct,[4] and the existing though limited case law, I was (with respect) frankly surprised that Shandro’s counsel would bother arguing that the law society had no jurisdiction over extra-professional conduct. As the majority reasons put it, “there is ample legal authority”[5] that provides otherwise. What is new and noteworthy from Shandro is that the majority was likewise bold and definitive in its recognition that the motivations for a complaint do not affect whether the conduct of a lawyer (in this case a lawyer-politician) has been inappropriate:

[W]e certainly appreciate that the complaints arose in a heated political environment. However, even where a complainant has a political agenda, that does not by itself mean they do not have valid concerns about the conduct of Mr. Shandro. The complainants may have brought the complaints forward for a collateral purpose, namely political influence, but that does not by itself determine that the conduct did not amount to sanctionable misconduct.[6]

In other words – sure, it’s political, but you’re a politician, so how could it not be? In more definite terms, it is unclear how any law society could fulfil its mandate to regulate the legal profession in the public interest with such a gap in its jurisdiction. And while this holding is most directly important for lawyer-politicians, it also reflects that vindictive complaints against any lawyer are not necessarily without merit merely because they are vindictive. While lawyers and their counsel may argue otherwise in the future, they will be on thinner ice when they do so.

This holding also reflects faith in the regulatory processes and safeguards of the law society. In my idealistic view, this faith is appropriate and necessary. That is of course not to say that any law society is infallible or that those processes and safeguards may not be effectively marshalled in every instance. But to discount or suspect or stream regulatory complaints based on the identity and/or purported (or express) motivations of the complainant is not an appropriate response.[7]

There may well be disagreement – as there was between the majority and the dissent in Shandro – over whether any particular incident amounts to conduct worthy of sanction. That disagreement, however, is very different from disagreement over whether law societies can and should regulate lawyer-politicians, or whether only righteous complaints from the noble and pure-hearted should be considered.

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[1] See e.g. Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics versus Political Practices: The Application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to Lawyer-Politicians” (2012) 91:1 Canadian Bar Review 1 at 23. See also Adam Dodek, “Public Office and Standards of Conduct” National Magazine (April–May 2013), online: <https://web.archive.org/web/20231231190114/http://web.archive.org/web/20130730042805/http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/April_-_May_2013/Public_office_and_standards_of_conduct.aspx>: “Law society disciplinary proceedings may be used to carry over battles from the political forum.”

[2] Shandro at para 222.

[3] See e.g. Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Limits of Professional Regulation in Canada: Law Societies and Non-Practising Lawyers” (2016) 19:1 Legal Ethics 169.

[4] See e.g. Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct, r 7.4-1 (quoted at para 17): “A lawyer who holds public office must, in the discharge of official duties, adhere to standards of conduct as high as those required of a lawyer engaged in the practice of law.” The extent to which the commentary to this rule softens this imperative was addressed to some extent by the panel. See also Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8s 49(1)(b), quoted at para 20 by the majority and at para 221 by the dissent, which gives the law society jurisdiction over a member lawyer’s conduct “whether or not that conduct relates to the member’s practice as a barrister and solicitor and whether or not that conduct occurs in Alberta.”

[5] Shandro at para 27.

[6] Shandro at para 24.

[7] See by analogy the question of whether or not a complaint against a Justice of the Peace should be addressed differently because it happened to be made by a Crown Attorney: Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Crown Attorneys, the Attorney General, and Judicial Discipline: A Comment on Lauzon v Ontario (Justices of the Peace Review Council)” (2025) 47:4 Manitoba Law Journal [forthcoming], online: <https://themanitobalawjournal.com/volumes/>.